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Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of the coherence in the infrastructures. More precisely, it examines 
the articulation between technical and institutional coherence. It assumes that a certain degree of such 
coherence is necessary for infrastructures (network industries) not only to properly function, but 
moreover to be both economically and socially performing. The paper takes the current unbundling of 
the electricity and the railways sectors as cases so as to analyze whether and how the dynamics of 
deregulation (liberalization) leads to such incoherence. It is therefore grounded in organizational 
behaviour and institutional analysis and focuses on the strategies of the actors in a liberalized 
environment. The paper is therefore primarily conceptual in nature, as it seeks to frame the dynamics of 
the liberalizing network industries in terms of a co-evolution between technology and institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liberalization in infrastructures is focused on institutional changes, such as unbundling, deregulation, 
privatization, public-private partnerships, asymmetric regulation, and other practices related to market 
structure. The idea is to obtain efficiencies and quality improvements, basically by means of 
introducing a competitive economic market structure and private sector oriented institutional regimes. 
In this approach, technology is mainly considered as being a constant. The technical system, it was 
assumed, would operate more efficiently because of a market-oriented approach. Economically 
oriented actors would create new contractual arrangements on a voluntary basis, if required. In some 
extreme cases, a sector-specific regulator might “support” this process. Institutional innovation was to 
create a market, and technology was either a product or an instrument of such a market, but considered 
as a system whose function constituted a necessary condition for the market. 
This paper questions this very assumption, namely that (1) institutional changes are sufficient to create 
a market in the infrastructures, that (2) technology would remain at a stable and neutral condition, so 
as to support the functioning of the market, and that (3) sector-specific regulation would be sufficient 
to make these market-type arrangements work. As a matter of fact, it may well be that, in certain 
cases, technology goes against markets, or at least does not automatically support liberalization. This 
paper builds on the co-evolution between technology and institutions literature and applies it to the 
infrastructures, saying that there is a need for coherence between both in order to safeguard a 
satisfactory technical functioning, which in turn will determine economic and social performance. We 
focus on one specific element of the liberalization of infrastructures, i.e., network unbundling, as this 
was the core idea of institutional change so as to create markets in infrastructures.  
From an economic perspective networks are traditionally considered a focal point of regulation in 
infrastructure-bounded markets. Networks are unique and essential facilities with characteristics of a 
natural monopoly. This implies that even in liberalized markets, physical networks represent 
monopolistic facilities that fundamentally distort market functioning. In order to prevent undesirable 
opportunistic behavior by network operators – i.e., gaining advantage by obstructing third party access 
– sector-specific regulation requires that network operations be separated from other core activities 
such as trade, metering, and sales. These associated commercial activities are allowed to compete, 
whereas the networks have to function as regulated monopolistic activities. This separation between 
the networks and the production/trade/metering/sales of is often referred to as “unbundling”. 
However, network unbundling is an institutional change before being a technical one. As a matter of 
fact, and from a technical perspective, network unbundling might pose considerable problems for the 
technical functioning of the network operations. In the electricity sector and in rail transport, the 
technical operation of networks is indivisibly connected to the so-called commercial activities of – for 
instance – electricity production and trade, or the transport of goods and services to different 
destinations in the railway network. In the electricity sector the network operator needs to physically 
balance demand and supply, even in liberalized markets. Electricity production and transport are, to a 
certain degree, technical substitutes that can equally be utilized to balance demand and supply. In the 
railroad sector the operation, monitoring and maintenance of the tracks can hardly be technically 
separated form each other. In these cases, unbundling creates institutional barriers that obstruct the 
technical functioning of the system. The unbundling of the railroad sector in the UK resulted in serious 
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technical malfunctioning of the system that caused several deadly accidents. The blackouts in the 
electricity system are symptoms for the difficult technical coordination of the unbundled commercial 
activities.  
The question therefore is whether network unbundling as an institutional change will obstruct the very 
technical functioning of the electricity and rail transport sectors, and whether the dynamics triggered 
by such unbundling will trigger a dynamics that is beneficial or detrimental to the function of the 
technical system. Conceptually, we will approach this question from an organizational and an 
institutional perspective. In other words, we will try to understand what network unbundling, as an 
institutional change, triggers in terms of actors (strategic) behavior, and how such behavior affects the 
entire technical system in both the electricity and the railway sector in terms of economic, social, and 
technical performance. 
The paper is therefore structured as follows: in a second chapter, we will recall our conceptual 
framework, i.e., the idea of a co-evolution between institutions and technology. Our hypothesis is that 
there needs to be a certain degree of coherence between institutions and technology in order to 
safeguard the satisfactory functioning of infrastructure sectors. The next two chapters will focus on the 
degree of coherence between institutions and technology in the unbundled electricity and the railways 
sectors. In particular, we compare the situations in both sectors before and after unbundling, both in 
technical and in institutional terms. Both will highlight, in particular, which actors emerge and play a 
role after unbundling. Chapter 5 will then identify these actors’ (strategic) behavior and dynamics in 
both sectors. In particular, it will show the relevant actors’ strategies both vis-à-vis the other actors in 
the (now much broader) industry, but also their respective strategies vis-à-vis the technical 
infrastructure, in particular vis-à-vis technological innovation. Indeed, the whole idea of unbundling is 
to create competition among the users of the network, thus introducing a significant change in 
behavior among them. In the conclusion, then, we will assess how these actors’ strategies and 
dynamics are likely to affect the performance of the electricity and the railways sectors in economic, 
social, and technical terms. 
1. TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
As said above, we work with the assumption that there needs to be a certain coherence between the 
technical and the institutional coordination for the network industries (infrastructures) to function and 
moreover to perform both in economic and social terms. This assumption, in turn, is grounded in the 
literature on the co-evolution between technology and institutions, a literature, which however so far 
has not been focused on the network industries. The following figure summarizes our assumption. 
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Figure 1: Our broad conceptual framework. 
On the basis of this broader conceptual framework, we now explore the possible relationship between 
technological and institutional coordination of infrastructures on the one hand and the performance of 
these infrastructures on the other. Our line of argument is illustrated in figure No.2. 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between technology, institutions, and performance of infrastructures. 
At the most basic level, we start with the definition of four basics functions that need to be guaranteed 
in order to safeguard the functioning of infrastructure related networks. These basic functions need to 
be supported technically as well as institutionally by some governance mechanism. We will argue in 
the following paragraph that there needs to be a certain degree of coherence between this technical and 
institutional coordination in order to satisfy different aspects of infrastructure performance, i.e. 
economic performance, public values and technical system integrity. We will summarize our argument 
here only very briefly. For a more detailed discussion we refer to our earlier work.1
                                                     
1  Finger et. Al. 2005. 
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More precisely, we argue that in the network industries four basic system-relevant functions need to be 
performed so that they properly function. The following functions are related to the operation of 
networks that enable the complementarity between the nodes and links in infrastructures. 
Interconnection deals with the physical linkages of different networks that perform similar or 
complementary tasks (e.g., Economides, 1996). Typical examples include the interconnection of 
different telecom networks, railroad tracks or electricity systems. Interoperability is realized if mutual 
interactions between network elements are enabled in order to facilitate systems’ complementarity. 
For example, in the railroad sector, the specification of the tracks needs to be aligned with the needs of 
the locomotives. Interoperability defines the technical and institutional conditions under which 
infrastructure networks can be utilized. Capacity management is necessary in order to allocate scarce 
resources with the networks. Depending on the time scale on which this capacity allocation occurs, 
different aspects of capacity management can be distinguished2: real-time operational, like the 
dispatching of the electricity system, tactical (for instance maintenance scheduling) or long term 
strategic (building of new rail tracks). System management pertains to the question of how the overall 
system (e.g., the flow between the various nodes and links) is being managed and how the quality of 
service is safeguarded. 
On a very basic level, three different coordination mechanisms can be identified; i.e. centralized, 
decentralized and peer-to-peer (e.g., Powell, 1996; Thompson, 1996), 3 as summarized in table No.1. 
This simple distinction is based on the level of decision-making. A centralized system uses a top-down 
approach, in which some centralized authority controls all major systems elements or operations. In a 
technical system, there might be an operator that controls the entire production process. The equivalent 
institutional arrangement is for instance a centrally planned economy.  
In a decentralized system, decision-making is distributed throughout numerous agents. System 
coordination is realized by certain institutional arrangements, but without any active planning or direct 
intervention. A very famous example in this respect is the institutional coordination of competitive 
markets. All actors compete against each other and search their own profit. The price mechanism is the 
invisible hand that co-ordinates the system in a way that markets are cleared and social welfare is 
optimized. A likewise technical system is for instance road transportation. Participants enter this 
infrastructure based on individual preferences and decisions. The transport service is based on the 
available capacity at the specific moment of use. The coordination of the functioning of the entire road 
transport system is effectuated by traffic rules that govern the behavior of individual users. Besides, 
capacity problems are solved through queuing and temporary storage, which is commonly known as 
traffic congestion.  
Under the conditions of peer-to-peer coordination, self-selected agents mutually co-ordinate their 
activities based on bilateral agreements. A system might be coordinated through bilateral 
arrangements between different agents. Bilateral contracts are typical institutional arrangements that 
fit this category. Actors agree on a specific exchange of goods or services that fit their individual 
needs. In the Internet for instance, peer-to-peer agreements are established for the mutual exchange of 
electronic traffic. In air transport there are alliances of carriers that mutually coordinate their services 
                                                     
2  Ten Heuvelhof et. al. 2003. 
3  These authors use the notion of network instead of peer-to-peer. We chose for this latter notion in order to 
avoid confusion with different definitions of the notion of networks.  
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in order to gain competitive advantages. Often this includes also a mutual technical coordination of the 
corresponding technical networks.  
Table 3: Different types of coordination mechanisms. 
Coordination mechanism Technical coordination Institutional coordination 
Centralized Centralized control:  top-down Planned economy 
Decentralized Distributed control bottom-up 
Market economy; classical 
contracting 
Peer to peer Peer-to-peer control Relational contracting 
Taking these three types of coordination as a point of reference, it is now possible to define two 
aspects of coherence:  
• Comparable technical and institutional coordination mechanisms; 
• Comparable scope of control. We consider the scope of technical and institutional coordination as 
coherent if they are related to comparable system boundaries. In other words, technical and 
institutional coordination is related to the same entity but with respect to different harmonization 
needs.  
In line with the idea of a co-evolution between institutions and technology (e.g., Dosi, 1982; North, 
1990; Perez, 2002; Saviotti, 1996; Soete, 1985; van Tunzelmann, 2003), we argue that there is an 
interrelation between the technical and institutional coordination of infrastructures. The four major 
network functions – e.g., interconnection, interoperability, capacity management, and system 
management – are pivotal for enabling the functioning of infrastructures and taking profit from the 
complementarities between the systems’ nodes and links. A comparable institutional and technological 
coordination is necessary to enable these functions to support the production of goods and services 
throughout the infrastructure. The more these coordination mechanisms are coherent, the better 
infrastructures perform. We illustrate our argument in the next two chapters by using the examples of 
electricity and railways unbundling. 
2. THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR BEFORE AND AFTER 
UNBUNDLING 
Traditionally the electricity sector has been strongly vertically integrated between production, high-
voltage long-distance transmission, low-voltage distribution, and sales. One single firm might have 
integrated all activities within their own scope of control, typically organized as a regional monopoly. 
In other cases, production and transmission was integrated, next to distribution and supply. The 
electricity sector was largely institutionalized along with the technical system boundaries of the 
respective networks. This changed quite fundamentally after the liberalization. From an institutional 
perspective, liberalization required unbundling of the value chain into independent entities. Since 
network related activities are considered natural monopolies, they could not be exposed to competitive 
markets. Roughly electricity production and supply are perceived as commercial activities, whereas 
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transmission and distribution are regulated monopolies. Figure 4 depicts the structure of the electricity 
value chain before and after liberalization.  
Transmissionr i iTrade/PRPr / Meteringt ri SaleslDistributioni tri tiProductionr ti Customert r
Customert rProductionr ti Trade/PRPr / Transmissionr i i Distributioni tri ti Meteringt ri Salesl
 
Figure 4: The electricity value chain before and after liberalization (Fens, 2005). 
From a technical point of view the activities within the value chain are strongly interrelated, before as 
well as after the liberalization. There was no major technical change in this respect. Electricity is 
generated at the production unit. It is then traded on the wholesale market and transported via the 
transmission unit (highways for electricity) and the distribution unit (regional and local networks for 
electricity). The electricity is metered during transport not only for billing purposes but also to ensure 
proper management of the physical flow of electricity in the entire value chain. Finally, in the sales 
unit the physical flow ends with delivery to the end customer according to the contracts agreed upon. 
Technically the electricity sector has to be managed as one single integrated system. The flow of 
electricity cannot be directed between specific economic actors. It rather depends on the specific 
physical circumstances of the electricity system how and whether specific physical transactions are 
possible. In order to allow a continuous availability of high quality electricity, all parts of the system 
from production to supply have to be technically balanced at each moment of time. Transmission and 
distribution systems operators are in charge for this technical balancing of the electricity network. 
From an economic perspective this technical system management is a pure collective good that cannot 
be provided by market allocation.  
2.1 Characterization of system relevant functions 
Interoperability is realized through a close standardization of technical processes and requirements 
with respect to the quality of electricity that is delivered throughout the system. Among others, the 
systems voltage is determined within certain margins, the amplitudes of the alternate currents are 
synchronized and there is a central authority that oversees the standards and the systems operation. In 
Europe for example, UCTE4 coordinates the operation and development of the electricity transmission 
network between some 23 countries. This organization is active for more than 50 years. Coordination 
of transmission activities is necessary because the electricity network technically functions as one 
large system, in which the flow of electric currents cannot be directed. According to physical laws, 
electricity flows are determined by the differences of electric resistance within the system. Between 
different systems, electricity cannot be exchanged without additional technical measures. In principle 
these electricity systems operate independently from each other. 
                                                     
4  Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity, www.ucte.org 
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Interconnection appears within the boundaries and conditions of the above mentioned electricity 
systems as physical links between different regional or national networks. Interconnection appears at 
two different levels. First, between different high-voltage transmission networks, which is overseen by 
the Transmission system operators (TSO’s). Second, between the transmission network and 
distribution networks. These interconnections are coordinated between the TSO’s and the Distribution 
Network Operators (DSO’s).  
Capacity management is achieved as follows. .At the strategic level terms and conditions for network 
access are documented in a so-called network code. On the tactical level the quality standards are 
largely given through the regulations of the international electricity system. Operational capacity 
management is usually handled at the level of the transmission system operator. In liberalized 
electricity markets, suppliers of electric power as well as traders (who represent the customers) have to 
notify the TSO of their supply or demand 24 hours in advance for each period of 30 minutes. The TSO 
is able to calculate the technical opportunities of the system to meet these requirements. If technically 
necessary, rearrangements have to be made. Since electricity cannot be stored, the balancing of 
demand and supply is a very challenging task. The physical limitations of networks and the 
availability of production capacity has to be adjusted against a technically uncontrollable demand for 
electricity. Usually there is no demand side management involved in the operation of electricity 
systems.  
In the case of the electricity sector, system management deals with the continuous technical balancing 
of the production and use of electricity as well as safeguarding the quality of service. Load 
management is vital. It includes the provision of back-up capacity for the case of emergency or 
unexpected increases in demand. Also the technical quality needs to be maintained, for example in 
terms of frequency, reactive energy, and voltage. Commonly these tasks are directed to the system 
operator.  
2.2 Determination of the degree of coherence between technical and 
institutional coordination 
The technical coordination can be best characterized as centralized top-down control. Electricity 
systems like the UCTE are governed by a central administered and controlled regime of norms and 
standards. The regional or national system operators have very significant technical tasks with respect 
to interconnection, capacity management and system management. With respect to the technical scope 
of control, certainly the boundaries of the electricity system describe the ultimate limits. Within these 
boundaries certain subsystems can be acknowledged. On the high voltage transmission network level, 
there are various interconnected regional or national networks. On the low voltage level there are 
many distribution networks that have no major technical functions expect the transformation and 
transport of electricity to the final customer. 
In liberalized markets, the institutional coordination ideally fits the decentralized coordination 
mechanism with bottom-up control. Consumers and producers take their allocation decisions based on 
individual preferences, needs and profitability. There are at best insufficient or even absent pricing 
signals with respect to the physical network capacity. Network complementarities are not adequately 
supported by pricing signals. Actors just behave as if the network is a ‘copper plate’ that allows all 
kinds of economic transactions without any physical restrictions. The scope of the institutional 
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coordination of is not per se limited by the technical boundaries. Well functioning markets have the 
tendency for international expansion and ultimately globalization. Nowadays differences in national 
regulation establish barriers for trade and determine in this way the institutional boundaries of the 
electricity market.  
Prior to liberalization the institutional coordination was quite different. There was a high degree of 
vertical integration of electricity firms, as indicated in the value chain in figure 3. These firms 
functioned as integrated regional monopolies and had an economic incentive to capitalize on the 
network complementarities. Under these conditions the institutional coordination was more centralized 
with top-down control. The scope of institutional control was very much in line with the scope of 
technical control.  
It can be concluded that prior to liberalization there was a high degree of coherence between the 
institutional and technical coordination of the sectors activities. Liberalization resulted in a novel 
institutional structure of the sector, leaving the technical coordination unchanged. Consequently, 
technical and institutional coordination are incoherent.  
2.3 Analysis of system performance 
According to our hypothesis we would expect that the performance of the electricity sector is 
deteriorating after liberalization. We will shortly reflect on this hypothesis with respect to the three 
performance criteria we earlier defined. 
With respect to the economic performance there are indications that price efficiency increased. For 
example in the EU the price for electricity seemed to have declined on average.5 Without any further 
research it is very difficult to provide evidence whether dynamic efficiency or system efficiency is 
improved. Considering the innovativeness it should be noted that in the past years quite some new 
technologies reached the market. Examples include small-scale electricity production, clean 
technologies, metering and control. On the other hand, there have been quite some noticeable 
economic disasters in the electricity sector, like for instance the Enron bankruptcy and the California 
energy crises. Based on this very superficial approach, it can be stated that at there is at least no hard 
evidence for the validity of our hypothesis with respect to the economic performance. 
Safeguarding public values is a growing concern. Security of supply is high on the political agenda of 
many countries, even as environmental sustainability of electricity production. Universal service 
obligations are an important issue for example with respect to the accessibility to electric power. Also 
the affordability of electric power is an issue, which is recently amplified by the raising oil and gas 
prices. The reliability seems to decline, since energy firms try to operate closer to the technical system 
capacity in order to economize their production processes. There is genuine concern whether the 
market mechanism provides sufficient incentives to build new electric power capacity, even for off-
peak or emergency purposes. Prior to liberalization, these issues were far less prominent. 
The integrity of the technical system is not supported by the institutional arrangements of liberalized 
markets. The above-mentioned energy outages in California, but also in Europe indicate that there 
                                                     
5  Kema 2005. 
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might be a problem in this respect. Systems seem to be less robust, among others as a consequence of 
declining reserve margins in production and networks. 
Based on this very rough and certainly incomplete analysis a differentiated picture about the 
performance of the electricity sector after liberalization arises. While there might be some 
improvements with respect to price efficiency and innovativeness, there are growing concerns with 
respect to the realization of public values and the safeguarding of the technical system integrity. These 
latter are certainly new problems. However, prior to liberalization economic performance might have 
been weak, but the other performance criteria might have been stronger. Without any further research 
the trade-off between both is difficult to make. This case demonstrates that after liberalization the 
technical coordination is a serious problem that needs to be resolved in order to guarantee the long-
term satisfactory functioning of the electricity system. Our model suggests that either the technical 
coordination has to evolve into a mode of distributed control, or the institutional co-ordinated needs be 
centralized again.  
3. THE RAILWAY SECTOR BEFORE AND AFTER UNBUNDLING 
Historically, the railway sector in Europe is a typical vertically integrated industry. A national public 
operator owns the tracks, the signals, the railway stations, and of course the locomotives and wagons. 
Suppliers are few and closely related with the historical public operator. Many countries even have 
their own suppliers. In federalist countries – e.g., Germany, Switzerland, Austria – there are also 
regional public monopolies, which however generally are integrated within the national railways 
system (e.g., harmonization of the timetable). The system is strongly determined by national policies 
and there is often little interconnection between the different national public monopolies. Also, there is 
little; technical innovation making the sector not very dynamic. In addition, in all European countries, 
rail is heavily subsidized. Figure 5 summarizes the structure of the railway sector before and after 
liberalization. 
Rail infrastructure:
tracks, signals
Rail infrastructure:
tracks, signals
Railway
stations
Railway
stations
Passenger and
cargo trains
Passenger and
cargo trains
Value-added
services
Slot
allocation  
Figure 5: Structure of the railway sector before and after liberalization 
Unbundling, in the railways sector, initially takes the form of a separation between infrastructures 
(tracks and signals) on the one hand and transport (i.e., passenger and cargo trains using these very 
infrastructures). However it rapidly appears that unbundling is not as simple.  
• Indeed, as, in a first step, cargo transport services become commercial (in the European Union as of 
2008), appears the necessity to allocate slots in a neutral manner. It thus becomes necessary to 
create a slot allocator which is independent both of the infrastructure owner and of the train 
operating companies (TOCs), at least as long as the infrastructure operator and one of the TOCs is 
still publicly owned. The institutional structure here is very similar to the air transport sector, where 
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an air traffic control (ATC) operator allocates the routes. In principle, the slot allocator can be a 
commercially oriented company, which however has to be regulated. This question of slot 
allocation is nevertheless substantially complexified by the fact that there exist at least four 
different public policy objectives in rail transport, namely cargo, international passenger transport, 
national passenger transport, and regional/agglomeration transport. 
• In addition, as passenger transport becomes liberalized (in the European Union planned for 2010-
12) arises the question of the railway stations. They also have to become independent of the TOCs 
so as not to favor any of the TOCs over another. Again, railway stations can become commercially 
oriented companies. 
From a purely technical point of view, the rail transport system needs to operate as an integrated 
system. The main challenge here in terms of system integration pertains to the (passenger) timetable, 
where the allocation of slots is being harmonized. Currently, there exists only one coherent timetable 
per country, but with the liberalization of the passenger transport it becomes conceivable to have 
parallel or even competing timetables, thus posing serious problems to the technical integrity of the 
railway system. 
3.1 Characterization of the system relevant functions 
The four system relevant technical functions – i.e., interoperability, interconnection, capacity 
management, and system management – also apply in the railway sector. In this section, we will 
briefly describe these four functions. To recall, historically all four functions were integrated in the 
public monopoly. 
• Interoperability pertains first of all to the usage of the infrastructures: indeed, locomotives and 
wagons have to be interoperable with the railway infrastructure, i.e., in particular with the tracks, 
but also with all the safety relevant infrastructures (e.g., signals). At the most basic level, such 
interoperability pertains to track width, but also to technical harmonization regarding the 
communication between the TOC and the infrastructure. 
• Interconnection historically pertained to the different national integrated railway companies 
connecting to one another. In the federalist countries, it also pertained to the different regional 
companies connecting to the national monopoly operator. In a liberalized environment, 
interconnection, in addition to the above, will also pertain to the different TOCs connecting to one 
another (if relevant), for example when wagons of a certain TOCs are connected to a locomotive of 
another TOC. 
• Capacity management, as said above, is historically integrated in the public monopoly operator. In 
a liberalized environment, however, capacity management takes the form of slot allocation. 
Institutionally, such slot allocation needs to be separated from the TOCs using the infrastructure. If 
one of the TOCs and the infrastructure operator remain publicly owned the slot allocator also needs 
to be independent of the infrastructure operator. Slot allocation in the railway sector is – just like in 
the air transport sector – primarily a safety matter. The slot allocator thus needs to attribute the 
available capacity in a way that it is optimally used, yet does not pose any safety threat. 
• System management historically takes the form of stable timetables. These timetables were 
produced by the historical monopolistic public operator. In a liberalized environment however, 
timetables of the different TOCs need to be consolidated and harmonized. Such consolidation and 
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harmonization in turn should be done by yet another independent body, which ideally is not 
identical to the slot allocator. Rather, the slot allocator accepts the timetables as constraints and as a 
limitation for the available slots. 
3.2 Determination of the degree of coherence between technical and 
institutional coordination 
At the time when there was one national public railway operator coherence between technical and 
institutional coordination was ensured by this very operator, and took the form of hierarchy. As a 
matter of fact, the historical operator determined its timetable which was harmonized with the 
available slots and interoperability was not a problem. Interconnection between the historical national 
monopoly operator and the regional operators was also hierarchically organized, whereas international 
interconnection was firstly less important and secondly handled on a professional level by means of 
network coordination. 
Liberalization is likely to introduce – and already introduces to a certain extent – a certain incoherence 
between technical coordination and institutional coordination. Indeed while from a technical point of 
view interoperability, capacity management, and system management will have to continue to be 
coordinated in a hierarchical manner, there is a certain pressure to allocate slots commercially and 
even to have competition among timetables. Also, in matters of interoperability a certain competition 
will arise, which is likely to be arbitrated by suppliers who will be able to take advantage of competing 
standards (between infrastructure operators and TOCs) by imposing their own standards. In other 
words, coordination problems are likely to significantly increase as a result of liberalization, which in 
turn will increase the incoherence between technical and institutional coordination. The question 
therefore is what implications this decline of coherence will have on performance. 
3.3 Consequences on performance 
Overall, it is still to early to make an assessment of the performance of the railway sector after 
liberalization, as liberalization is still little advanced in Europe, except in the cargo segment of the 
market. However, it is nevertheless possible to make some predictions regarding economic, social, and 
technical performance. 
• In economic performance terms, there are likely to be efficiency gains once TOCs compete against 
one another. The question however is whether these efficiency gains are not simply being 
compensated by some efficiency losses in the still monopolistic segments of the market. Thus, if 
cargo is being liberalized, it is likely that the reduced prices will be compensated by increases in 
passenger traffic. As a matter of fact, it will only be possible to judge the efficiency of the TOCs 
once all passenger traffic is being liberalized. Also, one would have to judge whether the efficiency 
of the railway system as such is increased as a result of liberalization. Indeed, such overall system 
efficiency might be problematic because of the fragmentation of the railway system as a result of 
liberalization, which will significantly increase transaction costs (e.g., regulatory costs). 
• In social performance terms, the main challenge will pertain to regional transport. Currently such 
transport – along with the railway infrastructure – is heavily subsidized, and is not sure that the 
liberalization will make such subsidies less likely. Rather, what one will have to watch out for is 
whether the efficiency gains or costs savings in the competitive segments of the market (cargo, 
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international and national passenger transport) will not come at the expense of an increase in 
subsidies for regional and agglomeration transport. Again, this might happen because of increased 
transaction costs, but also as a result of coordination problems, given the fragmented railway 
system. 
• In technical performance terms, the main issue is safety. Indeed, the fragmentation of the railways 
system, and notably interoperability interfaces and capacity management issues, may well lead to 
safety problems. Furthermore, the multiplication of actors is likely to lead to a multiplication of 
technical standards, thus increasing problems of interoperability, interconnection, and ultimately 
safety. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN BOTH SECTORS 
In the previous two chapters, we have examined the question of coherence between institutions and 
technology from a static point of view, thus looking in particular at the multiplication of actors and the 
fragmentation of the (electricity and railway) system. In this chapter, we will examine more closely 
the institutional dynamics resulting from liberalization in both the electricity and the railway sectors. 
This is based on the assumption – grounded in organizational behavior and institutional theory – that 
liberalization in general and unbundling in particular is before all an institutional change, which in turn 
will create new incentive structures for the involved actors, thus triggering a certain dynamics within 
and among the involved actors. This chapter is structured as follows: in a first section, we will present 
the theory which will allows us to analyze, in sections two and three, the institutional dynamics of the 
electricity and the railway sectors. 
4.1 Theoretical considerations 
As seen above, liberalization in general and unbundling in particular mean, before all, a multiplication 
of actors. To recall, actors can be individuals, groups, and organizations, which in turn can be public, 
private, and even third sector entities. Each actor pursues one, but generally multiple goals, which can 
be conflicting. Organizational behavior theory predicts that each actor, in parallel to achieving its 
goal(s), also seeks to increase its “discretionary power”. (Discretionary) power can be defined as the 
capacity to get others to do what oneself does not want to do. This means that each actor always also 
seeks to acquire a certain capacity to define its own goals (and this in parallel and in addition to trying 
to achieve its own goal(s)).  
Generally, the goals for any given organization are set by rules which are located outside of these very 
actors, generally by governance structures. These rules set incentives, which affect both the 
organization as such, but also the actors inside the organization. In some cases, these rules set 
commercial incentives (e.g., profit), but in other cases these rules set incentives that pertain to 
recognition, power, and others more. As said above, all actors strategize to increase their discretionary 
power. They do so by trying to influence the rules by which they are governed, i.e., by trying to 
influence the rules in a way that their discretionary power is increased. In other words, actors 
strategize (1) vis-à-vis other actors and (2) vis-à-vis the rules that govern them so as to (a) achieve 
their goals and (b) to increase their discretionary power. 
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Such actor behavior determines the dynamics of any given (actor) system, and it takes place regardless 
of the governance structure (e.g., hierarchy, markets, networks), regardless of the industry or sector, 
and regardless of cultural differences. In other words, such actor behavior takes place both before and 
after unbundling of the network industries. Before unbundling the monopolist basically only had the 
political authorities to deal with. In organizational and institutional terms, the political authorities were 
both actors (minister in charge of the monopoly, government, and parliament) whose goals had to be 
satisfied, and definers of (institutional) rules, under which the monopoly had to play. In other words, 
goal achievement and incentives were somewhat aligned, even though goals were multiple and 
changing over time. After unbundling, i.e., in a more liberalized environment, things became more 
complicated: on the one hand, there is a multiplication of actors, each of which pursues different goals 
(e.g., profit, control). On the other hand, the institutional rules (i.e., the incentive structures) multiply 
and also diversify. As a matter of fact, it is now perfectly possible that goal achievement and incentive 
structures are no longer aligned, and actually even contradictory. It is also possible that any given 
actor operates under different incompatible incentive structures. This can lead to goal displacement, 
goal multiplication, and thus to inefficiency. But, such a “confusing” environment can also lead to the 
fact that the actor can substantially increase its discretionary power, particularly under weak 
governance. Innovation in general and technological innovation in particular are both means for goal 
achievement and for increasing any given actor’s discretionary power. 
In the next two sections we now want examine how such actor dynamics plays out in both the 
electricity and the railway sector. This will give us an indication whether, to what extent, and how, 
over time, the above highlighted emerging incoherences between technology and institutions in the 
electricity and the railway sectors will either be exacerbated or actually reduced. 
4.2 Institutional dynamics in electricity 
Liberalized electricity markets can develop as three different institutional structures or market designs 
(Hunt & Shuttleworth 1996): the single buyer model, wholesale competition, retail competition. In this 
paper we only focus on the latter case of retail competition, which we consider this as the most 
extreme case of restructuring from an institutional perspective. In this case, the value chain is 
completely unbundled into different and distinct economic activities. Besides, the commercial 
activities are often privatized, whereas the regulated network activities are either public or private. The 
most significant actors and their respective goals are shortly characterized in the following paragraphs. 
We  will specifically focus on the question to what degree the different actors take into account the 
four fundamental functions that need to be fulfilled in order to safeguard the technical integrity of the 
system.  
• The electricity producers operate as profit maximizing firms. They need to cope with the financial 
risks of their long-term investments in the generation plants. Investments are only attractive if there 
is sufficient confidence in the market’s demand and hence long-term profitability. Before 
liberalization, vertically integrated firms were allowed to sell electricity to the final customer, 
based on a cost-plus tariff. Under this regime, investment risks were allocated to the final 
customers. In a liberalized market however, the producers have to share a considerable part of these 
investment risks. As a consequence, they will be more reluctant to invest in new power plants, and 
they will economize on present and future production assets. This causes problems with respect to 
capacity management, especially security of supply (i.e. generation adequacy). On a very short 
term strategic behavior of electricity generators might even be contrary to the system needs. In 
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times of acute shortages of electricity supply (like in the California energy crises) producers can 
maximize their profits by withholding capacity. This does certainly not serve the systems 
objectives.  
• Electricity traders (wholesale and retail) can be either completely independent intermediaries, or 
vertically integrated with the producers. In the latter case they can aggregate demand, possibly by 
long-term contracts, and thus help to mitigate the investment risks of the electricity producers. This 
seems to be a quite dominant firm strategy. Under these circumstances it is likely that the traders 
follow the objectives of the producers.  The position of independent traders is characterized by 
profit maximizing behavior. They are likely to lobby for low network tariffs, and non-
discriminatory access to the grid. There is no ‘natural’ interest in pertaining and financially 
supporting the fundamental system functions.  
• The network companies (transmission and distribution) are strongly regulated monopolistic firms 
that are expected to monitor and sustain the system performance. The unbundled transmission firm 
is often responsible for transmission and system operations. This means that not only transmission 
services are supplied, but also critical technical system functions are safeguarded. This includes 
real-time operational capacity management (like voltage control and disturbance response), and 
longer term issues like transmission planning. The objectives of these transmission system 
operators (TSO) are oriented towards the technical functioning of the electricity system and can 
thus be expected to serve the above-mentioned four fundamental functions. On the other hand, 
there might also be some profit objectives, especially if these firms are privatized. Since the tariffs 
of these firms are regulated, they might strategize vis-à-vis the political authorities.  
Distribution system operators (DSO) only have limited local tasks for the supply of electricity from 
the high voltage delivery point to the final customers. They need to make sure that there is 
sufficient and reliable network capacity to satisfy the needs of the clients and the standards 
approved by government and enforced by the regulator.  
• Metering is a novel independent activity that was formerly part of the distribution activity. The 
metering activities are only very seldom organized as distinct economic activities. Mostly this 
function is vertically integrated either with trader of as part of the distribution company.  
• The regulator is an independent public entity that monitors and enforces governments’ objectives, 
especially with respect to network access, network tariffs, and the protection of residential 
customers. The regulator is not able to directly influence the four fundamental system functions. 
Through the regulatory framework they are able to provide incentives to the DSO’s and TSO’s in 
order to serve the technical system integrity.  
These short examples illustrate the variety of actors, serving different objectives that are sometimes 
even contrary to safeguarding of the technical reliability of the electricity system. In this respect, 
liberalization resulted in diffuse sectorial organization that might not represent a stable institutional 
equilibrium. The following figure 6 summarizes the likely contribution of the above-mentioned actors 
to the four fundamental technical functions. 
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Table 6: Likely contribution of each actor to technical system integrity. 
Interconnection  Interoperability Capacity management 
System 
management 
Electricity 
producers 
- - -/+ -/+ 
Traders - - -/+ -/+ 
Network 
companies 
++ + + ++ 
Metering - - +/- + 
Regulator -/+ -/+ -/+ - 
It appears that the network companies, especially the TSO’s, have a very important responsibility with 
respect to the technical system integrity. However, as a consequence of the vertical unbundling, the 
opportunities of the TSO’s to safeguard these technical functions are limited only to the network. This 
causes problems, since there are strong complementarities between the network and other components 
of the system. For example, long-term capacity management requires investments in generation 
capacity, which has to be realized by the producers.  
It seems as if the liberalization policy did not sufficiently take into account the technical consequences 
of the institutional restructuring. The question is however, whether the technical characteristics can be 
taken as a given. Firms can be expected to innovate if this serves their objectives. For instance, there is 
a growing interest in small-scale electricity production. Among others, this mitigates the financial 
risks for new build power plants. Besides, it also allows serving specific needs of final customers (i.e. 
product differentiation). There are even considerations to develop so-called smart networks, which 
enable a stronger technical unbundling of the electricity system that can be compared to the network 
stricture of the Internet. If this technical development pertains, the institutional restructuring would be 
followed a technical restructuring of the system. Up to now, we are not able to sufficiently understand 
and conceptualize the relation between institutional and technological change in infrastructures. Our 
second case is another illustration for this hypothesis.  
4.3 Institutional dynamics in railways 
As observed above, in the railway sector liberalization will lead to a multiplication of actors, all of 
which will pursue their own goals. Let us briefly mention here only the main involved actors with their 
respective goal(s): 
• The infrastructure operator will rent out its infrastructure to TOCs at a certain price, which will be 
regulated. The goal of this infrastructure operator will be to maximize this price and thus revenue 
by seeking to get the regulator (as price setter). The infrastructure operator will also strategize vis-
à-vis the TOCs so as to minimize the costs of using its infrastructure, as well as vis-à-vis the 
suppliers so as to build train operating material which is optimally compatible with its 
infrastructure. Finally, it will strategize vis-à-vis the political authorities so as to obtain (a 
maximum amount of) subsidies for its infrastructure construction and perhaps maintenance. 
• The train operating companies (TOCs) will pay a few for using the infrastructure. Their profits will 
stem from the difference between what they charge their customers (chargers and passengers), the 
15 
cost of their operations, and the fee for using the infrastructure. The goal of the TOCs will be – in 
addition to acquiring paying customers – to minimize the infrastructure usage fee, and this will 
mainly be done by means of lobbying the regulator. While on the “market” the TOCs will be in 
competition, they will however be united to lobby the regulator when it comes to the access fee and 
other rules governing their access to the railway infrastructure. 
• The slot allocator will be, in principle, an independent body both from the infrastructure operator 
and the TOCs. It will operate under rules set by the political authorities (and to a lesser extent by 
the regulator), but it will be supervised by the regulator. Its two main goals will be efficiency and 
safety. Whenever conflicting, the goal of safety will prevail over the goal of efficiency. Besides 
complying with these two (conflicting) goals, the main strategy of the slot allocator will be to 
increase its discretionary power vis-à-vis the regulator, the TOCs, and the infrastructure operator. It 
will do so by trying to set the definitions and rules of what constitutes efficiency and safety in the 
railway sector. 
• The regulator will both supervise the slot allocator and set and implement the access rules. Its main 
goal will be ensure the functioning of the infrastructure, ensuring simultaneously competition, 
consumer protection (quality, accessibility, affordability), sustainability of the railway system, and 
safety. These are all conflicting goals, and the strategy of the regulator will be to increase its 
discretionary power (vis-à-vis the political authorities) so as to be able to set the priorities to its 
own advantage. Most likely, safety and consumer protection will prevail over competition and 
(long-term) sustainability of the system. 
• The suppliers – especially the suppliers of the TOCs (rolling stock) and to a lesser extent the 
suppliers of the infrastructure operator (e.g., signals, tracks) will substantially increase their power 
in the liberalized railway sector, especially if they are able to join hands. Their goal of course will 
be to maximize profits and they will try to do so by standardizing their products. They will thus not 
only strategize vis-à-vis the infrastructure operators and the TOCs, but also vis-à-vis the slot 
allocator and especially vis-à-vis the regulator so as to set rules that are favorable to them. 
Looking at the above actor dynamics triggered by liberalization in the railway sector, the 
consequences can hardly be said to be beneficial: each actor strategizes vis-à-vis one or several other 
actors so as to achieve their goals (e.g., profit, safety) and to increase their discretionary power in the 
process. This is most likely to increase transactions among all involved actors, and thus transaction 
and coordination costs. In other words, the multiplication of the involved actors, each having their own 
goals to achieve and having their own strategy, is ultimately detrimental to the overall railway system. 
However, within the broader conceptual framework of the co-evolution between technology and 
institutions, such actor dynamics is problematic only as long as technology is considered to be a 
constant. Indeed, when seeking to satisfy the set goals and when seeking to increase one’s 
discretionary power, organizations will always also seek to innovate, be it by way of technology or by 
way of social innovations. It is therefore perfectly possible that new (technological) solutions to the 
above coordination problems will be emerging along such actor dynamics. In order to assess whether 
and to what extent such actor dynamics will ultimately be beneficial or detrimental to the railway 
system, one will have to examine in more detail what the different actors are likely to contribute to the 
technical functioning of the railway system in terms of interconnection, interoperability, capacity 
management, and system management, all problems which had emerged as a result of liberalization. 
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The following table will thus try to assess for each of the above identified actor whether he is likely to 
contribute to each of these four functions. 
Table 7: Likely contribution of each actor to technological coherence. 
Interconnection  Interoperability Capacity management 
System 
management 
Infrastructure 
operator 
+/- + - - 
TOCs ++ - + +/- 
Slot allocator - +/- ++ - 
Regulator - ++ + ++ 
Suppliers ++ +/- + ++ 
Besides indicating which technical problems are most likely in a liberalized railway environment, the 
above table also indicates possible alliances among actors so as to address these problems. Finally, an 
overall and more systematic assessment of this table will highlight the potential for (technical) 
innovation in the above for areas which all are necessary of an infrastructure system to properly 
function. 
CONCLUSION OF THE PAPER 
This paper addresses the question of the coherence in the infrastructures. More precisely, it examines 
the articulation between technical and institutional coherence. It assumes that a certain degree of such 
coherence is necessary for infrastructures (network industries) not only to properly function, but 
moreover to be both economically and socially performing. The paper takes the current unbundling of 
the electricity and the railways sectors as cases so as to analyze whether and how the dynamics of 
deregulation (liberalization) leads to such incoherence.  
Four basic technical functions are identified that need to be safeguarded in order to guarantee the 
technical integrity of infrastructure systems (i.e. capacity management, system management, 
interoperability and interconnection). In unbundled infrastructures these functions are associated to 
different actors with diffuse objectives. The illustrative case studies for electricity and rail transport 
demonstrate an even growing incoherence between institutions and technologies. The restructuring of 
these infrastructures have therefore resulted in an unstable situation with unsatisfactory guarantees for 
the technical system stability. The unbundling of the value chains in electricity and rail transport has 
resulted in very complex market structures with problematic structures of property rights and decision 
rights. This situation asks for a more detailed analysis of the technological and institutional dynamics 
of these sectors. The paper is therefore primarily conceptual in nature, as it seeks to frame these 
dynamics of the liberalizing network industries in terms of a co-evolution between technology and 
institutions.  
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